From: posting-system@google.com Sent: Thursday, January 17, 2002 1:52 PM To: brian@holtz.org Subject: Re: evidence for the existence of god (LONG!) -- A From: brian@holtz.org (Brian Holtz) Newsgroups: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: evidence for the existence of god (LONG!) -- A References: <15726-3C3676A0-95@storefull-247.iap.bryant.webtv.net> <29c16047.0201161253.60e064aa@posting.google.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: 12.236.1.8 Message-ID: <29c16047.0201171352.6b5c26ab@posting.google.com> G Riggs writes from the email account of his wife Elizabeth Hubbell: > > Selection operates on genes and individuals, not on species. > > But doesn't fitness of genes and individuals inevitably > entail larger fitness of a greater number of members > of a species? Increased reproductive fitness for individuals does indeed usually amount to increased fitness of the species. > [I'm not] suggesting that a species consciously > "thinks" to itself as a group I know; I'm just saying one should avoid language that suggests that members of a species tend to be cooperating with each other rather than competing with each other. For example, when a male lion takes over the pride and kills the existing cubs (that he didn't sire), it would be less than apt to say he is trying to preserve the species, even if his behavior has that side-effect. He's just trying to preserve his own genes, and that's what preserves the species. > all individuals, being "self-centered" (your term, which I agree is preferable to "selfish", Umm, I use the term "self-interest" at one point in my book, but I have no problem with "selfish". > will seek to make things easier for themselves and > their immediate posterity. That, in turn, > can lead to a securer species in the long run. Yes, but often at the expense of competing members of the species (and *their* posterity). > > Humans, like all known social organisms, are naturally > > cooperative. Humans are not by nature necessarily evil, > > but their natural self-interest gives them a natural > > capacity for evil. In their natural social environment > > of family and community, humans tend naturally to be > > more good than evil, and to cooperate for mutual benefit. > > You, in coupling your "tend naturally to be more good than > evil" phrase with a follow-up "to cooperate for mutual > benefit" clause, appear to be equating "tend naturally > to be more good than evil" with "to cooperate for mutual > benefit". In equating the two, aren't you implying that > "good" is somehow equivalent to "cooperate"? I'm definitely implying that this cooperation promotes something that I consider good. In my book I explicitly make the (not objectively justifiable) decision to value extropy and consider it "good". Extropy includes intelligence, life, and the autonomy they need to flourish. Human social cooperation promotes extropy, so I consider it "good". It's not by coincidence that most humans implicitly make value judgements that directly or indirectly result in notions of "good" and "evil" that to a first approximation are operationally equivalent to mine. That is why, when I say humans tend to be more good than evil, I don't bother repeating that there still is no objective rational basis for values. I'm simply invoking the values that I and most humans happen to share. A pessimist or a pietist might object that, by their (not objectively justifiable) value judgements, humans most certainly are evil. They simply have chosen values different from most peoples'. > why not re-examine [..] my assumption that preservation > of a species is inherently good? I too make the (not objectively justifiable) value judgement that life is good and therefore that species are to be preserved (ceteris paribus). > Shall we continue this exchange on the forum Yes, thus. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net