From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2002 8:33 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Jesse Nowells" wrote: > > > We don't know all the "laws of nature" so how can we presume > > > that just because something can't be explained by a "law of > > > nature" that therefore it must be something with an > > > extra-natural property? > > > We don't "presume [..] it must"; we just provisionally > > conclude it is supernatural if that's what the available > > evidence tells us. > > But that's not what the available evidence necessarily tells anyone. I didn't say that's what the currently-available evidence necessarily tells anyone. I said that's what the hypothetically- available evidence could possibly tell someone. > > The fact that all empirical > > conclusions are provisional does not justify asserting that this > > particular kind of provisional conclusion (supernaturality) should > > never be believed under any possible circumstances. > > One can claim that things should be belived in based on an > expediency that doesn't have anything to do with inquiry. Is it "an expediency that doesn't have anything to do with inquiry" to believe in electric charge, just because it is (for now) the simplest explanation that is consistent with all the evidence? > In order to believe in supernaturalisms one has to already > believe in the conclusion that > supernaturalisms draw about reality. False. I don't already believe in any such conclusions, but I can describe the possible evidence that would make me (and just about anybody) believe in the supernatural. > > The concept of God can only explain why there is something > > rather than nothing if it can be shown that God is a > > self-caused first cause. Nobody has shown this. > > Look, if god always existed or there is an infinite chain of causes, none > of that explains why there is something rather than nothing. Please read what I wrote. I said "a self-caused first cause" would explain why there is something rather than nothing. This is true almost by definition. Do you dispute it? > > > > the universe might merely be the undreamed possible > > > > dream of no particular dreamer. > > > > An undreamed dream of no particular dreamer is contradictory. > > > It's no more contradictory than an uncounted possible number > > with no particular counter. > > Then call it a possible dream I did; you dropped the "possible". My original statement is restored above. > rather than an undreamed dream as if it is > yet to be dreamed by some dreamer. A possible dream that has never been dreamed by any dreamer is indeed "undreamed" -- i.e. not dreamed. Nothing I said implies that the undreamed dream is due to eventually be dreamed. > > A possible dream is still a possible dream even if it has never > > been dreamed. > > The universe apparently exists so how could it be a dream yet to be > dreamed? As I said earlier: Whether the universe we perceive existed or not, it as a merely possible universe would be perceived by its merely possible inhabitants no differently than it as an actual universe would be perceived by its actual inhabitants. (By analogy, the thoughts and perceptions of a particular artificial intelligence in a simulated universe would be the same across identical "runs" of the simulation, regardless of whether we bothered to initiate such a "run" once, twice -- or never.) -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net