From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 9:27 PM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Jesse Nowells" wrote: > > When someone says there's "no difference" > > between republicans and democrats, do you really think they're > > asserting an ontological identity? > > There are differences between these two parties [..] Thus the answer to my question is "no". > I can't assume that any possible world you mention is in fact > the actual world. I never asked anyone to assume that, and I defy you to quote me doing so. > If one says a world is possible then that means that it may or > may not exist. If one says a world is actual then one is asserting > that it does exist. I ask yet again: under what definition of 'exist'? (Synonyms for 'exist' don't count as definitions.) > Whether you agree or not, the above is parseable. Indeed -- under the assumption that 'existence' is defined in a way that both applies to worlds and is distinguishable from 'possibility'. You give no justification for this assumption; you merely assert it. > Mentioning that you have > a thesis, that you may have bothered to state a zillion posts ago, > does not make your thesis parsable to anyone at *this* point. LOL, since I RESTATED my thesis in the very post you quote -- and then you QUOTED me doing so: > > My thesis is that nobody has "described > > (and not just named or labeled) a difference between an > > actual world and a merely possible world", and so there is > > "no reason to consider them different". > > Nobody can describe the details of nothingness Nothingness has no details to describe. > but as long as a possibility is not apparently actual, > there is no reason to presume that a > possibility & actuality are the *same*. As long as actuality and mere possibility are indistinguishable for worlds, there is no reason to presume they are different (for worlds). (Can you say 'parsimony'?) > Prove that actual world & a merely possible world are the > same in logical worlds. What do you mean by "same"? (NOW who's being ambiguous? :-) As I told you, I of course do not say they enjoy ontological identity. But I do say that nobody has proposed any distinction between actuality and mere possibility for worlds. > Show that you are not merely signifying an equivalence between the > possibility of the actual world with its actuality. By the principle of the Identity of Indiscernables, I indeed assert such an equivalence. If you know of a discernable difference between the two notions for worlds, state it and thereby prove me wrong. (Of course, if you could do so, you'd have done so by now.) > > but I can certainly point to your deafening silence when > > asked to describe (and not just name or label) such a difference. > > That signifies nothing in support of your "thesis" at all, Argument by assertion. You again fail to distinguish that which I claim is indistinguishable. > so where is your argument in support of your thesis? The heart of my argument is in fact your omnipresent failure to describe the relevant distinction. > Your conclusion is arguably absurd. Argument by assertion. If my conclusion is so "absurd", why debate it? If I said "1+1=3", would you debate it indefinitely? :-) -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net