Subject: Re: JH: The Design Argument Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 18:42:17 -0700 From: "Brian Holtz" To: "Brian Holtz" "Netcom jimhumph" wrote : > > I don't accept that the claim that we are finding less and less > design in the world is sustainable. Plainly dances, computer > programs, paintings etc are the products of design. In the context of the Teleological Argument, what counts is original design, not derivative design. Are you seriously claiming that every line of Java code I write increases the evidence for a cosmic designer? (My code is beautiful, but it's not *that* beautiful. :-) > clear at all what you mean when you refer to a 'declining > trend' . Please clarify. I earlier described the trend as starting from a baseline of the "gaps" caused by the absence of a naturalistic understanding of physics, astronomy, meteorology, agriculture, and physiology. Most of these gaps began closing after 1500, but by 1850, there were still no naturalistic explanations for the origin and diversity of life, the mechanism of mind, and the origin of the universe itself. In 2000, compelling naturalistic explanations already exist for the diversity of life and the mechanism of mind, while outlines of naturalistic explanations are being formed for the origins of life and the universe itself. > > > > Is there then no possible pattern of empirical evidence that could > > > > dissuade you from theism? Is your theism empirically unfalsifiable? > > > > > > > how can one empirically test theism ( or naturalism)? > > > > Naturalism could be empirically falsified by [miracles] > > > But thats not what falsifiable means. Would Naturalism not be shown to be false by such evidence? > For a theory to be falsifiable > one must be able to *specify some test which one could carry out* > which would falsify the theory. Instead of debating the definition of "falsifiable", why don't you just answer the question I was rephrasing? I.e.: is there no possible pattern of empirical evidence that could dissuade you from theism? > Naturalism is not an empirically > testable theory, but - like theism- a metaphysical explanation. So (again), is your belief in theism independent of all possible empirical evidence? Is there no observable difference between a possible world in which theism is true and one in which it is false? > > Theism would be easy to verify if there were any good empirical > > evidence for it. > > > Theism is not a theory Are you seriously claiming that it would not be possible for an actual god to produce empirical evidence that would make me a theist by tomorrow? Or do you avoid discussing the verifiability of theism because of the embarrassing lack of such evidence? :-) > - as I said above it is a metaphysical explanation. Then your definition of theism is different than mine. I define it as the thesis that the universe is affected by supernatural agency, where supernatural means not bound by the lawlike regularities that appear to govern the material world. How do *you* define it? > > Parsimony thus requires that > > [theism] provisionally be considered false. > > > please explain exactly *how* parsimony dictates it The available empirical evidence can be explained just as well without gods as with. > One considers it alongside such considerations as clarity, 'fit' with > existing theory, economy, breadth etc. To me, parsimony includes "clarity" and "economy". As I note in my book, parsimony is how one decides between theories that are "otherwise equivalent". "Fit" and "breadth" are ways that theories can be inequivalent. > It isn't a principle of logic, and there > is no reason to suppose that the more parsimonious of two > explanations is the theory which 'true'. Pure logic can define truth for analytic propositions, but not for synthetic propositions. Judging the truth of synthetic propositions requires epistemology and not just logic alone. I define truth (recursively) as logical and parsimonious consistency with evidence and with other truth. > it would always be arguable that the > highest level laws were the product of design. Ah, so I was right: there is *no* possible pattern of empirical evidence that could dissuade you from theism. It seems that your teleological argument in fact reduces to one or both of the ontological and cosmological arguments. This perhaps explains why, in a thread devoted to your argument from design, you've talked so much about metaphysics, and so little about empirical evidence of design. :-) > > > one can, I consider , show that necessarily > > > if God exists he exists necessarily. > > > The above is *not* a statement of the ontological argument. If it's not, then isn't it just a tautology derived from the definition of "God"? (Feel free to give us your definition. :-) A quick check of The Encyclopedia Of Philosophy confirms that your statement is the heart of the ontological argument as formulated by Hartshorne and Malcolm. Their argument then adds that God's existence is either necessary or logically contradictory, that it is not logically contradictory, and that thus it is necessary. As the article notes, the argument "fails" due to its "illicit shift between the notions of ontological and logical necessity". "In modern philosophy, logical necessity is a concept which applies only to propositions; a proposition is logically necessary if it is true in virtue of the meanings of the terms composing it. And it is a basic empiricist principle that existential propositions cannot be logically necessary." And: "existential propositions are always synthetic, always true or false as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of definition." > > an explanation parallel to yours, as follows. If logical > > possibility exists, then this universe is necessarily > > logically possible and the "brute fact" of its apparent existence > > is replaced with the necessity that its existence would seem > > apparent > > > There isn't any 'parallel argument'. An argument for theism > such as the one I refer to above utilizes the notion of > a maximally perfect reality- that concept isn't open to the atheist. The parallel is that both argue that the existence of the universe is explainable once you grant either "maximally perfect reality" (whatever that is) or the necessary existence of logical possibility. > When have more time I will present the argument to make this clearer. Please do. Or provide a reference to the literature. > > the invalidity of the Ontological Argument. > > The ontological argument can be presented in a form which is > deductively valid- validity is not the issue. Critics of the argument > would say that it is unsound. I didn't mean formal logical validity, but rather strength in establishing a reliable conclusion, which I gather you'd rather call "soundness". Fine, use whatever definitions you like, just as long as you reveal them to us. > > Who gives the guarantee that there must be a knowable answer to > > the question "why does anything exist?"? > > > I am prefectly prepared to allow that this could be the case- > the point is that if the atheist goes down this route he has > abandoned any sort of pretence that his explanation is > empirically based. Atheists indeed base their explanation of reality on empirical evidence and their rational understanding thereof. Furthermore, atheists readily admit that their explanation and understanding is uncertain and incomplete. Now, could you explain precisely what pretense you think you've identified? Are you saying that any worldview that does not (at least pretend to) answer the Big Why is necessarily non-empirical? > He's in the realm of "faith" in other words. Only if (as you seem to) we take 'faith' to mean provisional belief in a hypothesis without complete certainty. Not only have you repeatedly declined to tell us what you mean by 'faith', you have also yet to respond to my last comments in our thread about faith: You are (probably deliberately) obscuring a distinction between skeptical empiricists (including most atheists and perhaps even yourself) and dogmatic believers in revelation (including many if not most adherents of revelation-based religions). Do you really think that arguments about 'faith' in a.a.m. parse correctly if 'faith' is replaced with 'strong but uncertain belief'? Do you really think that atheists' vehement denials of having "faith" are just a lexicographical misunderstanding, and that there is no concept or notion that they might be calling 'faith' that distinguishes the faithful from the faithless? I will ask yet again: do you have any beliefs based on revelation and exempt from doubt? I.e. are you one of them, or one of us? :-) -- Brian.Holtz@sun.com Knowledge is dangerous. Take a risk: http://humanknowledge.net