From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Saturday, February 23, 2002 9:35 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: The psychology of Atheism "Gurnemanz" wrote > Really, Brian, I find your reply a great disappointment. I'm curious: what do you expect me to do with this information? Do you think that by striking some kind of teacherly pose that someone will find your case more authoritative or convincing? > 1. On Consistency > --------------------- > > > It is not inconsistent > > > with the known laws of nature to hold that it is possible > > > that there is life after death. > > > > I didn't say life after death > > is not "possible". I said it is "inconsistent with the > > known laws of nature". Do you dispute this? > > > Very informally an inconsistent set of propositions is a > set of propositions that cannot all be true together. I'm familiar with the logical sense of 'consistency'. Are you familiar with the empirical sense of 'consistency'? It means "being in agreement with; coherent". It is logically possible that there is life after death, just as it is logically possible that your body could sit down and type a reply to this posting after being decapitated. However, both scenarios are sharply at odds with what science tells us about the necessary and sufficient conditions for such mental activity. Do you dispute this? Probably not, since you did not dispute my earlier statement that the efficacy of prayer is "indeed *physically* impossible under our best understanding of physics." > 2. On Prayer > ---------------- > > > prayers will be responded to in a manner > > > beneficial to the petitioner *not* that they will be > > > responded to in the manner *desired* by the petitioner. > > > Plainly these claims are not verifiable > > > > The "response" can hardly be very "beneficial" if the > > response cannot be verified as existing at all. > > > Whilst one cannot test the > efficacy of prayer scientifically, many attest to > its beneficial effects. "Scientifically" is your word, not mine. How can one attest to a "beneficial effect" for which one has no evidence? > 3. On Parsimony > ------------------ > > > And it is debateable whether psychological explanations > > > - where there are such-are more parsimonious. anyway. > > > > Unless you're willing to say that all such religious > > feelings are actual experiences of the divine, then you > > have to posit both divine *and* psychological > > explanations. I need only posit the latter. QED. > > > The most parsimonious explanation is > not necessarily the 'correct' one. I didn't say it was. I said that, ceteris paribus, the most parsimonious explanation must be provisionally considered true. > the most parsimonious explanation would be solipsism It's much more parsimonious to posit the universe of science (i.e. its laws and border conditions) than to posit a solipsism that nevertheless includes all the complex phenomena of my experience. > 4. On Religious Experiences > -------------------------------- > you are not proposing a single explanation but a whole set > of different psychological explanations. You are proposing the same set, plus your extra theological explanation. If not, then which psychological explanations are you claiming are never operant for religious experiences? > > Since even *you* > > seem to recognize that many religious experiences are > > naturalistically explicable, we can conclude that all > > religious experiences are equally naturalistically explicable. > > > Another glaringly obvious non sequitur: so obvious > that I do not think I need to comment here. You conveniently omit the first part of my argument in which I noted that "you cannot identify a religious experience or class thereof as being any less naturalistically explicable than the others." I challenge you to quote this entire argument and then refute it: 1. You have not identified a religious experience or class thereof as being any less naturalistically explicable than the others. 2. You seem to recognize that many religious experiences are naturalistically explicable. Therefore: 3. You have given us no reason not to think that all religious experiences are naturalistically explicable and equally so. > > I challenge you to assert the following: > > Religious experiences need not involve anything that could > > even be interpreted as hallucination, delusion, > > hysteria, intoxication, wishful thinking, misinterpretation, > > misperception, misunderstanding, ignorance, gullibility, > > or deception. > > Note that by simply proposing a naturalistic explanation > for religious experiences you do not thereby discredit them Note that by simply remarking on the existence of religious experiences you do not thereby make them credible. Now please answer the question you ignored: > I have theological reasons for doubting the veracity > of such reports [of ghosts] If you get to use your theology to discount ghost-reports, why don't we get to use our metaphysics (i.e. naturalism) to discount religious experiences? > to do that you wuld have to show that the unreliable > mechanism is operating *and * that it > produces the experiences and beliefs. I don't have to show that every apple ever fallen has followed the law of gravity to justifiably believe that nothing but gravity is needed to explain all such falls. If you think that some religious experiences defy the explanations I propose, then pick ANY such experience and tell us about it. > For example, some psychotics are nature mystics. > Nevertheless, psychosis may not cause their > religious experiences. Yes, and the pencil I just dropped "may" not have fallen due to gravity. Mere possibility does not constitute grounds for belief. Again: do you claim that even though all religious experiences are subject to naturalistic explanation, some of them nevertheless constitute evidence for God? > Psychotics have many experiences than cannot be > ascribed to their psychosis ( most of their sense > experiences are perfectly normal). OK, then tell us of just one religious experience that cannot be ascribed to the experiencer's psychology (i.e. my list of naturalistic psychological phenomena above). I note you had no answer for my question: Do you really not see the analogy between "gods caused this plague" and "gods caused this religious experience"? [4.5 The Shyness Argument] [------------------------] > >> Christianity allows that the creator does not > > > wish to effectively 'compel' belief > > > > This of course is the saddest argument of theists. > > Does anyone know how old it is? > > > Argumentum ad hominem. I didn't say that because this argument is sad/lame/desperate, it should therefore be disbelieved. My refutation of it followed, which I will repeat below since you ignored it. Meanwhile, do you dispute that the presumably recent vintage of this argument shows that theists have lost much of their confidence in their position since roughly a millenium ago? Now, a replay of my refutation: > which would be the case > if the sort of evidence you require were available. It was "available" in ancient Palestine from the time of Adam all the way to Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus. Your argument is refuted by Christianity's own documents. El/Yahweh had no compunction about "compelling" belief in the Old Testament, and Jesus had no compunction about "compelling" belief in the New Testament. It's simply immoral for a deity to threaten eternal punishment of non-believers while intentionally denying them any credible evidence of his existence. (Note that you must here admit that no philosophical "proof" of God's existence can be convincing, as such a proof would "compel belief".) Also, you conveniently deleted your previous assertion: > Religion claims that those who resolutly reject the deity > ie most atheists , will not receive any sort of revelation. > When they make a genuine effort to seek out religion they > can expect to receive guidance. Can you elaborate on the difference between "guidance", "credible evidence", and "compelling evidence"? Do you simply define "genuine" as only those "efforts" that result in coversion to theism, or do you have a non-question-begging definition of it? I'll take your next lack of response to this refutation as an admission that this "divine shyness" argument is indefensible, and I won't trouble you or our readers with it any more. > 5. On the Ontological Argument > ----------------------------------- > you claimed that you could reduce 'my' version of > the Teleological Argument ( actually I have no recollection > of any such argument) to the Cosmological argument It's not surprising you recall no such argument, since my point is that you have not made one. When asked for a design argument (in a thread created expressly for you to present one), you did a bait-and-switch by hand-waving at such an argument and then talking cosmology and ontology. You wrote on Jun 19: > the argument from design is a sinking ship[;] > a) are you on it? and b) do you have a lifeboat? > I consider that it is possible to construct such an argument as inference to best explanation which is quite powerful. > But science does whittle away at the argument from design, > You are thinking- I imagine- of Paley's argument. But there are stronger ways of stating the argument. The rest of your argumentation in this thread was cosmological and ontological. Now, maybe you have a design argument that you're keeping secret from us. Or maybe your design argument consists of your disposable Jun 23 remark about "dances, computer programs, paintings etc". The fact remains that when I ask you about design, you talk cosmology and ontology. Thus, your position in an argument about design reduces to cosmological and ontological arguments. I here repeat for a third time my invitation to talk design: Do you admit that, aside from the need for a first cause for the initial boundary conditions, all the apparent design in the universe can be explained without an intelligent designer? If not, please identify the relevant apparent design. > > Ah, so I was right: there is *no* possible pattern of empirical > > evidence that could dissuade you from theism. > > > my argument is this: the highest > level scientific laws *cannot* , logically, be explained by science, > since they are the means by which science explains > other phenomena. This is a cosmological argument, which I handled in the very posting you quote (and repeat below since you ignored it). It appears safe to assume that you concede that, aside from the need for a first cause for the initial boundary conditions, all the apparent design in the universe can be explained without an intelligent designer. > > > > > The argument aims to establish that a designer is the > > > > > best explanation for the apparent design of the universe, > > > > > it does not attempt to explain from whence came the designer. > > > > > That is a separate argument. > > > > > > > > No, it's clearly not. Part of being the "best explanation" > > > > for something is being the most parsimonious explanation. > > By "most parsimonious" I of course mean ceteris paribus. > > > But other things are not equal! Theism , I maintain > has greater breadth of explanation In that case, supertheism has even *greater* breadth. Supertheism says that your god El/Yahweh was created by SuperGod. Whether we are justified in believing in SuperGod is a "separate argument", because -- umm -- I say so. > > It is indeed the case that of explanations with equal > > explanatory power and equal logical consistency, the > > most parsimonious is the one to be considered correct or > > true. > > Yours is a common misunderstanding > of the principle of parsimony- it is a methodological principle: > we adopt a parsimonious approach to prevent our ontologies > from becoming bloated. It would indeed be convenient for you if the idea of parsimony -- i.e. economy of explanation -- applied only to ontology and not to explanations generally, but wishing doesn't make it so. > It is quite incorrect to suppose that > we ought to suppose the most parsimonious explanation is the > correct one. There is no basis for such a supposition at all- > evidence, please, if you disagree. Observe that it is generally never the case that of explanations with equal explanatory power, equal logical consistency, and equal consistency with other truths, the most parsimonious is NOT the one considered correct or true. Feel free to provide a counter-example. > > If you want, we can get into a big debate over the relationship > > of parsimony to truth, > > > I don't think we need to: you plainly have no case to present. Argument by assertion. You claim I have "no case" while editing out the rest of my sentence rather than responding to it: but it won't make us "ignore that unexplained explanandum behind the curtain" -- i.e. God -- while you complain that for us the universe is an unexplained explanandum. > > Your point, as I understand it, was that theism is a cosmology > > with more explanatory power, [simply because it "explains" the > > universe by introducing an unexplained extra entity. My > > contrary point is that theism is therefore a less parsimonious > > cosmology with in fact only *equal* explanatory power, and thus > > should be considered incorrect.] > > *Not* my point: theism is not a cosmology. Your point, as I understand it, was that theism provides an explanation of the existence and initial conditions of the cosmos and thus has more explanatory power than atheism. My contrary point is that introducing an unexplained extra entity makes theism less parsimonious with only *equal* explanatory power, and thus should be considered incorrect. Do you disagree, or is there some *other* term here (besides 'cosomology') that you need expanded in order to understand what I'm saying? -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net