From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Tuesday, March 12, 2002 9:20 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Brian Holtz on Religion- a critique Jim Humphries wrote > > > The claim that there is no *valid* proof for the existence > > > of God is false. [..] > > > What is the case, is that there are not indisputably *sound* > > > proofs for the existence > > > > By valid I indeed mean well-grounded or sound, rather than > > the special logical sense of the term. I'm changing "valid" > > to "convincing" here to prevent possible confusion. > > > Thats very unwise, because 'convincing' is so > subjective. It's no more subjective than your formulation of "indisputably sound". It's objective enough for my purposes. > What is convincing to one person > may not be so to another. By "convincing" I don't mean "able to convince any possible person". I mean "tending to convince any reasonable person". > > The credibility of evidence for existence of god(s) is no > > more "hopelessly subjective" than for existence of > > demons, forest spirits, vampires, werewolves, faeries, > > ghosts, reincarnation, alien abductions, etc. > > > What is convincing to one may not be so to another. Do you deny that reasonable people tend not to be convinced by the alleged evidence for demons, forest spirits, vampires, werewolves, faeries, ghosts, reincarnation, alien abductions, etc.? > > > >The Ontological proof assumes without evidence that ideas can exist > > > >independently of minds, or that universals can exist independently of > > > >instances. > > > > > > > In fact there are many- not one- versions of the Ontological > > > argument. Many make no such suppositions about universals etc. > > > > Reference, please. > > > there are many- Malcolm's, Plantinga's etc.. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that Malcolm's version confuses logical necessity and ontological necessity, which is the same sort of mistaken assumption I'm talking about: that the ontological world must take note of our logical stipulations. Platinga's version is no different. His is a modal version of the ontological argument, which (as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes) includes "premises which incur ontological commitment to the existence of" the being in question. The article gives a good summary of why ontological arguments cannot be convincing: In the premises of an ontological argument, the expressions with ontological commitment either appear in the scope of operators which cancel ontological commitment or they do not. If they do not, then the argument is question-begging (since the ontological commitment is presupposed by the premises); if they do, then the argument is simply invalid (one cannot validly eliminate operators which cancel ontological commitment). > do you hold that there are actual infinities > or do you hold that there are none? I don't know of any actual infinities, unless one counts the future as one. > > This assumes without argument that such a series of causes > > stands in need of a cause for the series as a whole. > > I see no reason to make that assumption. > > > But if the series *isn't* caused by a self-existent being, > you have *no explanation* There is no cause in the series for which I cannot point to its own cause -- namely, the prior one in the series. I see no reason to assume that the series as a whole needs a separate cause outside the series, any more than that the series of every other cause needs yet another outside cause. Perhaps instead you are really just asking the question "why is there something rather than nothing?". If so, note that theism can no better answer that question than atheism. > > > >The Anthropological proof is undermined by other, more plausible > > > >explanations for the origin of human nature. > > I have no recollection of any 'proof' being > presented by theists- could you cite a reference. The Catholic Encyclopedia gives two variants: "the argument from conscience" and "the argument from universal consent". See http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06608b.htm > these coincidences do indeed provide good grounds for > believing that theism is true. No, because there are other, more plausible explanations for the origin of human nature (such as evolution). > If you disagree, perhaps you could say why? I already said why; you quoted it and then ignored it, so I've just repeated it. > > > >The Mystical proof is undermined by other, more plausible > > > >explanations of mystical experiences. > > > Again , you are using terms like 'proof' and 'argument' > -which have quite distinct meanings in logic -in an eccentric > manner likely to cause confusion. 'Argument' has a well-accepted meaning in the not-purely-formal domains outside logic and mathematics. I suggest you consult a dictionary if you are not familiar with that meaning. :-) > > Regardless of Pascal's intentions, it has been offered > > by theists as a reason not to be an atheist. You seem > > to recognize that it is not such a reason. > > [..] It wouldn't apply to someone who regarded > different Gods as being deserving of equal consideration. And thus it is not a good reason for a typical atheist to adopt theism. > > > >Faith is belief based on revelation and exempt from doubt. > [..] > You've just provided self-serving stipulation of 'faith' > which doesn't correspond to the faith of most believers. "Most"? Then why have you failed three times to answer my request for the name of a *single* Christian believer who does not have any beliefs based on revelation and exempt from doubt? > > I now ask for a third time the question you didn't answer there: > > Can you name any Christians who hold subject to doubt > > the statement of John 3:16 that "God so loved the world that > > he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in him > > shall not perish but have eternal life"? > > An even more interesting question is: would you agree that it > > is inadvisable to hold any belief based on revelation and > > exempt from doubt? And: do you hold any such beliefs? > > (I've asked you this before, again with no response.) > > > I have said that personally I have not had anything which > could be described as a religious experience. By "revelation" I of course am not talking only about direct religious experience; it need only involve learning of someone else's religious experience. > I do not hold that it would be necessarily be inadvisable > to hold a view based on revelation. That wasn't my question. > I don't see why a view based on revelation should > necessarily be exempt from doubt. That wasn't the question either. I repeat: would you agree that it is inadvisable to hold any belief based on revelation and exempt from doubt? And for a third time: do you hold any such beliefs? And for a fourth time: Can you name any Christians who hold subject to doubt the statement of John 3:16 that "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life"? > > > >Mysticism is belief base on private and direct > > > >experience of ultimate reality. > > > >Mysticism holds that belief can be justified > > > >simply by the intensity or > > > >directness of an experience, and without a showing that > > > >the experience has any objective basis or consequences. > > > I think Rucker would say that your definition > doesn't include the characteristic feature of mysticism- > namely the breaking down of distinctions, the merging > of the One with the Many. In my survey of dictionary and encyclopedia definitions, no such feature is mentioned or emphasized as much as the directness or immediacy of mystical knowledge/intuition. See below. > And of course when you say > that Mysticiam holds that belief can be justified etc > that is nonsense. Only if by "nonsense" you mean agreement with dictionary definitions like the following: - a doctrine of an immediate spiritual intuition of truths believed to transcend ordinary understanding; - immediate consciousness of the transcendent or ultimate reality or God; - a belief in the existence of realities beyond perceptual or intellectual apprehension that are central to being and directly accessible by subjective experience; - a theory postulating the possibility of direct and intuitive acquisition of ineffable knowledge or power; - the belief that direct knowledge of God, spiritual truth, or ultimate reality can be attained through subjective experience (as intuition or insight) > > If a synthetic statement is neither falsifiable nor > > verifiable under any possible circumstances, then it > > is propositionally meaningless. > > > It follows then that your statement "If a synthetic > statement is neither falsifiable nor verifiable under > any possible circumstances, then it is propositionally > meaningless" is meaningless! It does not follow, because my statement is analytic -- i.e. it defines what is to be considered meaningless. > > By "inconsequential" here I mean not making (or motivated > > by) any difference in any possible world. For example, > > "the universe is one", taken as a synthetic statement, > > is inconsequential and therefore meaningless. (As an > > analytic statement, it's either false or a banal tautology.) > > The statement "The universe is one" is plainly not > inconsequential in every possible world however it is taken. Then please tell us a single observable difference between a world in which it is the case that "the universe is one" and a world in which it is not. > > > >Science depends on the epistemological principle of > > > >skepticism, and any "conflict" between science and > > > >religion is really a conflict between skepticism and faith > > > >(or mysticism). > > > > > > > Please [explain?] how science depends on the 'epistemological > > > principle of skepticism'. > > > > The scientific method includes experimental or empirical testing > > of theoretical consequences, reproducibility of results, and > > competition for agreement in the marketplace of ideas. These > > methods reflect skepticism: the idea that belief is always > > subject to doubt and justified through objective verification. > > > The notion that belief is justified by 'objective verification' > is not part ( or does not pertain exclusively to) scepticism. Skepticism in common and even philosophical usage indeed just means roughly doubt. By "the epistemological principle of skepticism" I don't simply mean doubt (or else I would have used just the word 'skepticism' in place of that phrase). > Nor is holding that beliefs are open to doubt required > to practice science. This is vague; are you trying to disagree with what I wrote above about the scientific method? > > NOMA is the right idea when applied > > to science and philosophy, or to science and that tiny > > subset of religion not based on faith or superstition. > > Gould seems to be talking about religion as he wishes > > (and tacitly encourages) it to be, rather than as it is. > > > [..] He is prescriptive, not descriptive. He is widely interpreted as descriptive, and at any rate, I've not seen any evidence that he understands that the search for value and meaning is precisely the domain of philosophy, and that religious thought is just a subset of philosophy (namely, theology). The most common mistake in discussions of the relationship between science and religion is to ignore philosophy. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net