From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2002 10:17 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Brian Holtz on Religion- a critique Jim Humphries wrote: > the lawyer's notion of proof > ('beyond reasonable doubt') is not that of the logician > who has a much more rigourous notion. The logical notion of formal, apodictically certain proof is not applicable to synthetic knowledge. For example, there cannot be a formal logical proof establishing the apodictic certainty of the proposition "America declared independence in 1776." > the notion of what is 'convincing' > is inappropriate in the present context. For example. > someone might find an argument 'unconvincing' even > if it was a sound argument. How is your notion of "sound" any more objective than my notion of "convincing"? Maybe you should just understand my 'convincing' to mean "sound". > > for any definition of "reasonable people" that you wouldn't > > look silly trying to defend, do you deny that reasonable people > > tend not to be convinced by the alleged evidence for demons, > > forest spirits, vampires, werewolves, faeries, ghosts, > > reincarnation, alien abductions, etc.? > > [..] I note that whilst you refer to an 'ordinary common- > usage meaning' you do not actually cite one. I already told you (and you quoted me below): "please assume common-usage dictionary definitions for any term whose definition is not indicated by the context". So pick any relevant sense from Merriam-Webster's or the OED, and stop retreating from the debate. > BTW very many , apparently normal, individuals > believe in ghosts. Bzzzt. You once again simply duck my challenge. > I keep trying to tell you > that 'reasonable people' and 'convincing proofs' are > too loose as terms to be used in the present context. And I keep telling you that they are 'tight' enough that you obviously would feel silly to deny that "reasonable" people tend not to be convinced by the alleged evidence for demons, forest spirits, vampires, werewolves, faeries, ghosts, reincarnation, alien abductions, etc. > Many people , for example, would maintain > that a belief in ghosts and so on is perfectly 'reasonable', Bzzzt. You once again simply duck my challenge. > There isn't really any way of saying who is right or > wrong. As I've said before, you're just hiding behind the trivial fact that there is no mechanical, algorithmic way to settle all debates about philosophical and empirical issues. This doesn't change the fact that some positions are laughable -- such as the one I'm challenging you to take, whose very laughability shows that my standard of "reasonableness" is sufficient for my purposes. > I will present [Plantinga's] argument as soon as I have > cleared a backlog of posts. I won't hold my breath. > > you haven't demonstrated (or even argued) that the > > series as a whole needs a separate explanation. > > > Not to present an explanation is simply to fall back on the > atheist's non-explanation of 'thats just the way things are' No, every relevant "thing" (i.e. effect) in the infinite series has a cause -- the cause prior to it in the series. No effect is left unexplained. Again: you simply have not demonstrated (or even argued) that the series as a whole is a separate "thing" or effect that needs a separate explanation. > - a retreat from rational enquiry. You argue by assertion, and then say the above. LOL. > You admit then that you cannot present an explanation I deny that you've successfully identified an explanandum. You've repeatedly declined to even try to argue the opposite. > > Do you deny that evolution helps explain the origin of human > > nature? > > > Not at all. It then follows that there are other, more plausible explanations for the origin of human nature, and that therefore the anthropological argument for God's existence fails. QED. > > Can you name any Christians who hold subject to doubt > > the statement of John 3:16 that "God so loved the world that > > he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in him > > shall not perish but have eternal life"? > > > Whether I can name any is besides the point No, your inability demonstrates that my definition of 'faith' correctly separates people commonly considered "infidels" from people commonly considered to have religious "faith". > ( I can do this easily). Pardon us for not taking your word for it. > most theists would maintain that their belief is not exempt > from doubt. Equally most would maintain that they > do not need to rely on revelation exclusively. Both irrelevant, as I've told you repeatedly. You evidently are afraid to engage the actual issue here: whether belief based on revelation and exempt from doubt is advisable, and whether people of religious faith completely lack any such beliefs. > > > > If a synthetic statement is neither falsifiable nor > > > > verifiable under any possible circumstances, then it > > > > is propositionally meaningless. [..] > > > > my statement is analytic -- > > > > i.e. it defines what is to be considered meaningless. > [..] > That your statement defines what is to be considered analytic, > does not mean that it is itself analaytic. No, my statement helps define what is to be considered "meaningless". Any statement that defines instead of describes is analytic. > my criticism of your verificationist principle, > is a well-known one. My formulation is different than the traditional ones. Oxford Companion to Philosophy: "a statement is meaningful if and only if it is verifiable". Encyclopedia of Philosophy: "for any sentence to be cognitively meaningful it must express a statement that is either analytic or empirically verifiable. [..] It was sometimes suggested that conclusive falsifiability rather than conclusive verifiability should be the criterion [..]" philosphypages.com: "the meaning of a proposition is just the set of observations or experiences which would determine its truth, so that an empirical proposition is meaningful only if it either actually has been verified or could at least in principle be verified." Ayer: "a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express" Michael Sudduth: "weak verificationist/falsificationist principle: a declarative sentence is factual and meaningful if and only if it is an observation-statement or there are observation-statements that, if true, would [..] raise [or lower] its probability [..]" My formulation is significantly different than each of the above, in that they include only one of falsifiabillity and verifiability as their criterion, or they say "if" in addition to "only if". The following "Phil 100" formulation comes closer, but he's simply wrong to later say that "God" and "evil demons" are "in principle undetectable". J.S. Russell: "Verificationism: for every declarative sentence (asserting the existence of some state of affairs), there must be some sort of evidence that would provide grounds for believing it or disbelieving it." > Verificationism > is widely regarded as being discredited by most philosophers. I too disagree with the sort of verificationism that considers all metaphysics meaningless. My book has plenty of metaphysics, none of which I consider meaningless. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net