From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 12:15 PM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Brian Holtz on Religion- a critique Jim Humphries wrote: > > How is your notion of "sound" any more objective than my > > notion of "convincing"? Maybe you should just understand > > my 'convincing' to mean "sound". > > > Its not *my* notion of 'sound' You said: "there are not indisputably *sound* proofs for the existence of God". I am asking how your notion of "indisputably sound" is any more objective than my notion of "convincing". > I am using that term in the > standard way that it is used in logic ie a sound argument > is a valid argument with true premises. The notion of > 'convincing' is- as I keep pointing out- subjective: I know. And I keep asking: how is it any *less* subjective than your notion of "indisputably sound"? > A 'convincing' > argument, might of course be one which was simply > presented by a politician skilled in rhetoric. Yes, and a "disputably sound" argument might simply be one which a stupid or cynically contentious person disputes. > Again: an argument which is 'reasonable' to one person may > not be to another. Again: an argument which is "indisputable" to one person may not be to another. > Even if we agreed that belief in the above > was 'unreasonable' ( or 'reasonable'), that does not mean that > the criterion is acceptable as a general one to evaluate arguments. Again: are you stating anything other than the trivial fact that there is no mechanical, algorithmic way to settle all debates about philosophical and empirical issues? > The *fact of there being a series* [of causes] at all is > left unexplained. As I told you five postings ago in this thread: Perhaps instead you are really just asking the question "why is there something rather than nothing?". If so, note that theism can no better answer that question than atheism. > > my definition of 'faith' > > correctly separates people commonly considered "infidels" from > > people commonly considered to have religious "faith". > > > A stipulative definition cannot be 'correct' or 'incorrect': it > just amounts to a proposal to use a word in a particular way. By "correct" above I obviously mean that my definition separates people in precisely the same way as does the common-usage distinction between those who have "religious faith" and those who do not. > 'faith' for the religious believer is > generally based on inconclusive evidence, rather than > none at all. I didn't say that faith is based on no evidence. I said it involves positing an authority the statements of which are considered exempt from doubt. You can keep misreading this, but I'll just keep pasting these same words in until you can successfully repeat them back to me. > > No, my statement helps define what is to be considered > > "meaningless". > > > [..] there is no reason to suppose that it captures the > antecedent meaning of 'meaningless'. The notion of "antecedent meaning" is somewhat dubious, as it threatens infinite regress. It suffices to compare the proposed definition with the usage and self-report of the relevant linguistic community. > nobody who > knows the meaning of "meaningless" as well as the meaning > of "verify/falsify" is likely to know that to be meaningless > is just to lack conditions for verification/falsification. As I've told you repeatedly, I've never said it is "just" that. Besides, it's been clear since at least Putnam (XYZ vs. H20) that meanings are not completely "in the head". As I say in my book: "the meaning of a term is the context-sensitive connotation ultimately established by its relevant denotation and use." Thus a speaker cannot necessarily be assumed to be able to produce by recall (as opposed to recognition, perhaps after reflection and even experimentation) a fully-nuanced definition of the words she nevertheless can competently use. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net