From: Brian Holtz [Brian.Holtz@sun.com] Sent: Friday, November 02, 2001 9:36 AM To: Brian Holtz Subject: Re: JH: The Design Argument A: Intelligent fine-tuning makes the physical constants more likely than they appear. B: Some unknown other explanation makes the physical constants more likely than they appear. "Paul Filseth" wrote: > they argue for (A), while they never give (A or B) a > moment's thought. They obviously prefer (A) on some basis other than > probabilistic reasoning. Yes, the choice between an epistemic commitment to (A) instead of (A or B) has to do with the relative likelihoods of A and B, and not the greater absolute likelihood of (A or B). > Many people divide the space of possibilities > into "a god" vs. "something else", when the nature of the problem makes > it more reasonable to divide the space into "improbability reducer" > vs. "multiple chances at the outcome". The reason why the possibility space is typically divided into "a god" vs. "something else" in discussions like this is that the discussion is about whether god exists. :-) > it's clearly overspecified for the evidence to be explained, > just as if it had read "purple improbability reducer". The analogy doesn't hold, because there are no grounds to debate the relative likelihood of purple vs. non-purple improbability reducers. > Why is it that the people who > believe in anthropic reasoning always say "life", and never stuff like > [someone being struck by lightning]? Because anthropic reasoning is about intelligent observers (which are a natural product of life), and not about lightning strikes. > > > In this case it's (A or B or C or D), where A is an intelligent > > > improbability reducer, B is an unintelligent improbability reducer, > > > C is other ways to implement intelligence in other kinds of physics, > > > and D is parallel universes. > > (A or B or C or D) is > the most it's reasonable to infer from narrow tolerances. I agree that there is as yet no dispositive case to be made either for or against any of these four possibilities. I predict that over time the case for B and C will strengthen while the case for A collects more dust. Progress may also be made on a philosophical argument for D, along the lines of our universe not being a parallel physical one but merely a logically possible one. > A is a subset of C and D as well. Perhaps, since you seemed to chang my definition of A. Your C and D are simply ways in which our physical constants might turn out not to be fine-tuned at all. > > I'm of course not saying that the evidence and argument for (A) > > are irrefutable. I'm merely disagreeing with your apparent assertion > > that the evidence is non-existent > > Present some. I did: http://www.reasons.org/resources/papers/astroevid.html > What observation favors "intelligent improbability > reducer" over "unintelligent improbability reducer"? If by "observation" you mean "empirical observation", then note that while empirical observations are the foundation of such "evidence and argument", they are not its totality. > > It's still an argument from design, only it's based on a whole lot > > less (but far more subtle) design. > > [..] But what is there in physics suggesting > that the constants are "for" life? The suggestion stems from the observations that a) the only system known to support life and intelligence is our physical universe, and b) minor perturbations of some of our fundamental physical constants would make known life impossible. > Most of the matter in the universe > is non-living and it follows exactly the same constants as living > matter. In the only system known to support life and intelligence, the non-living parts are necessary consequences of the settings of the physical constants that make life and intelligence possible. > > (unlike e.g. the Anthropological argument). > > What argument is that? That humans have a universal sense of morality and spirituality, and that the cause of this effect is God. > > > "hypothesis A" is as overspecified for the task of accounting for > > > the data at hand as "96 degrees" is for accounting for the > > > evaporation of some water. > > > > Not at all. In your taxonomy of hypotheses you have only four > > phyla, whereas there are any number of temperature species that can > > account for evaporation. > > Hypothesis A isn't a phylum -- it's a species. A is a top-level category in our 4-way taxonomy of explanations, and yet it's also an instance in your list that includes "theory Y", "theory Z", "theory C", and of course a "purple" theory. :-) I'll leave it to our readers to decide whether these considerations make A more analogous to a phylum or a species. > design is inferred or it's assumed; it's not apparent. > What there is, in physics, is narrow tolerances for certain classes > of phenomena, one of which has been selected for discussion on the > basis of unspecified criteria that include its narrow tolerance. The criteria are: 1) intelligence, being a) who we are, b) the most complex phenomenon in the universe, and c) what allows anthropic reasoning to occur; and 2) life, being necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for our intelligence to develop. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net