From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org]
Sent: Wednesday, March 06, 2002 1:24 PM
To: alt.atheism.moderated
Subject: Re: Are irrational numbers supernatural?

"Paul Holbach" <heir-of-holbach@freenet.de> wrote

> > I agree that this is the logical sense of "exist". There is a
> > separate ontological sense that indeed is a first-order predicate:
> > "having a causal relationship with the rest of the universe".
>
> it´s not a misuse of language to
> say eg the square root of 4 exists, that is there is a number which is
> the square root of 4, even though numbers do not interact at all with
> "the rest of the universe".

The mathematical sense of "exist" is not the same as the
ontological sense of "exist", and is indeed closer to the
logical sense of "exist".

> So we´d better add "really"+"exist" so
> that one can readily see that only causally effective
> entities are included in the concept.

Isn't "really" here just a synonym for "ontologically"?

> there are eg really
> existing psychological phenomena such as Unicorn-fantasies, whose
> content, the Unicorns themselves, certainly doesn´t really exist.

There's no need for your "really"s here, since the context is
ontological.

> > This is indeed how meaning is elaborated for words that are
> > basically extensional, like 'water'/'wetness'. However, this is
> > not how meaning is elaborated for words that are basically
> > intensional, like 'God'/'supernatural'.
>
> I agree, there´s the bottom-up and the top-down direction. But a
> posited top-down concept like "God"/"supernatural" allegedly referring
> to objective reality must eventually be empirically verifiable the
> bottom-up way

Indeed. As I told JH:
If a synthetic statement is neither falsifiable nor
verifiable under any possible circumstances, then it
is propositionally meaningless.

> > What would you say is his greatest insight or best theory?
> > His picture theory of meaning is lame. His critique of absolute
> > certainty is banal. His view of metaphysics is wrong. His notion of
> > language "games" is hopelessly over-burdened.  Being clever
> > or good-looking or influential is not the same thing as producing
> > good philosophy.
>
> If Wittgenstein was such a fashionable gasbag, how come he impressed
> dozens of other leading philosophers

I don't doubt that he was a stylish practitioner of analytic
philosophy who probably helped cement its deserved popularity.
It's just that I've never heard of a substantive position of
his that is not hopelessly over-stated or banal
or wrong. If an author can only be appreciated in the
original and not in paraphrase, then he might be a great
poet, but he can't be much of a philosopher.

> objectively assess the historical overall importance of
> Wittgenstein, but even in case he turned out to be a minor thinker

I never said he was unimportant or minor; on the contrary,
calling him overrated is the opposite of calling him unimportant.

> his relentless analytic rigour has had a
> deep and lasting influence on me, making me very watchful against any
> "metaphysical orgy" (Wittgenstein once said: "The analytic problems
> arise whenever language throws a party.")

This quip is a good example of a lack of "analytic rigour".
It's clever poetry, but it's simply not a substantive philosophical
position.

> I always try to do my best to follow his central
> exhortation: "Watch your language!"

Which is another way of saying "clarity is important". I of
course agree, but I don't see how this is not banal.

--
brian@holtz.org
http://humanknowledge.net