From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Saturday, May 18, 2002 8:06 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Paul Holbach" wrote: > > This is just a restatement of the stipulation that "merely possible" > > implies "non-actual". > > Mere possibility and actuality are incompatible. Of course, but you forget the context. By "merely possible" I was referring to the worlds you described as being possible while being not identical to our actual world, and which you claimed are necessarily non-actual. Are you claiming there can only be one actual world, and that no other possible worlds can be actual? > > In the absence of a non-question-begging definition of 'actual' > > as applied to worlds, a provisional conclusion of untenability > > is quite justified. > > These are the semantic aspects of "actual": > 1. (23) actual, existent -- (presently existing in fact and not merely > potential or possible This definition is question-begging, unless you can define 'existent', 'fact', and 'not merely possible' without reference to each other (or of course to 'actual'). > * 2. (8) actual -- (taking place in reality; not pretended or > imitated; > * 3. (3) actual, genuine, literal, real -- (being or reflecting the > essential or genuine character of something; > * 4. (2) actual, factual -- (of the nature of fact; having actual > existence; > * 5. de facto, actual, factual > * 6. actual -- (being or existing at the present moment Same problem. Definition by synonym is not adequate here. Unlike all of the above, my definition of actual/existent/real does not simply invoke a synonym. > Iīm sorry, but I cannot gather from that that "actual" should be > inapplicable to whole worlds. That's because all you've done is substituted 'actual' with its synonyms, rather than defined it. > why arenīt all modal notions equally inappliacble to whole > worlds if "actual" is an indexical. Wouldnīt "possible" be an > indexical as well? No, because 'possible' does not have the word 'this' in its definition, while actual/existent/real does (when actually defined and not just synonymized). > > "This is causally related to the rest of the universe." > > (I never said that 'actual' was a synonym for 'this'.) > > There are parts of the universe that are not causally connected As I say in my book, "causally related" means to ever have even the possibility of influencing or being influenced by. > (Of course, before > the inflation took place all parts of the early cosmic soup must have > been interrelated. Bingo. > > You are (again) confusing 1) whether the impossibility of time > > obtains... > > Is this supposed to be synonymous with "Time might be unreal." or > "Possibly, there can be no such thing as *time*."? (1) can be restated as "whether there is no such thing as time in our actual universe". By analogy, it's like you confusing (1) whether flying pigs exist and (2) whether they are possible. > If you say that there are infinitely many coexistent possible worlds, > arenīt you saying in the same breath that these worlds exist > synchronously such that "temporality" is used to refer to entire > worlds in order to compare them? Not at all. Time is nothing more than the ordering of events according to the potential of some events to causally influence other events. Events only happen in worlds, and the events in different worlds cannot be compared temporally because they have no potential to influence each other. > being in the same hyperworld is not identical > with being the same world. A world is by definition identical to its maximal possible "hyperworld" (to use your terminology), thus making the term "hyperworld" superfluous. > > To claim there is a difference between "possible worlds" and > > "actual worlds" without being able to describe such a difference > > is a linguistic self-deception. > > [..] such a theoretic as-if-ism mustnīt cover up the > logical fact that possibility doesnīt necessarily entail actuality. I don't know what "as-if-ism" is, but I do know that complaints about it mustn't cover up the fact that 'actuality' has a domain of definition and worlds are outside that domain. > itīs simply confusing to claim that all possible worlds > equally possess the same ontological value of actuality. I'm not wedded to the notion of choosing 'possible' as the meaning for 'actual' when used outside the normal definitional domain of 'actual', and I acknowledge that this choice could be confusing to people who do not understand that the definitional domain of 'actual' is not unlimited. But when people insist on talking about whether a possible other world is 'actual', I will insist on asking them to describe the difference they think they've identified between 'actual' and merely-possible worlds. > > I defy you to state "the truths of logic are dependent on the > > minds of human primates". > > ...dependent in the sense of an existential presupposition. Again: is this anything more than the facile observation that signs are only produced by sign-producers? > > Is this supposed to constitute an argument that the possibility of > > a world is somehow dependent on particular minds? > > The existence of the universe certainly doesnīt depend on the > existence of minds. I agree. > > I also know that "absolute unknowability" lies BY DEFINITION > > outside the limits of knowability. > > 15 love Holtz. (Hey, how'd you know I was a tennis player? Are you attending any of the matches in Hamburg this week?) > "ontologically possible" =(sense 2) that which might be real according > to the laws of nature. That is what philosophers call "nomologically possible". > If I say that a is not F or non-F, I must ascertain what the > truth-condition of such a statement ascribing a negative property But for any property F, isn't there a property that is the negation of F? How do you tell for any given property whether it is intrinsically "negative" or "positive"? > > For logical being I can. For ontological being I don't. > > Whatīs your distinction between logical and ontological being To logically be is to be the value of a bound variable. To ontologically be is to have a causal relationship with this sentence. > especially in the light of your claim "that there is no such > distinction, since what is logically possible is ontologically > possible". That logical possibility and ontological possibility are co-extensive does not imply that logical being and ontological being have the same meanings. > > Nothing is not a thing; Nothing is the absence of all things. > > Nothingness would indeed be the absence of all things, > but nothing is the absence of all things, > so nothingness doesnīt exist. > :-) Non sequitor. > > You said "...then S itself wouldn't exist", where S is a sentence > > describing the state of Nothingness. You're confusing Nothingness > > with the sentence S that describes Nothingness. Nothingness could > > obtain and S could still be true even if there are no actual > > enunciations of S. A statement doesn't have to be enunciated to > > be true. > > A statement doesnīt need to be "enunciated" but it must at least be > thought I of course include mental enunciation, and any other form of it you care to enunciate. > there are no true or false statements in case > there is no world. You once again confuse logical existence and ontological existence. There ontologically-are no true or false statement-performances *in* a world if there ontologically-is no such world, but there still can logically-be true of false statements about e.g. the possibility of that world. > Mind you, Iīm not saying that thereīd be no > material "way the world is" in case there are no minds. And thus, "the way the world is" is independent of e.g. the existence or non-existence of enunciations/thoughts/statements/ performances about Nothingness. QED. > > (1) Logic can only apply if minds exist. > > Do you claim (1), or not? Yes or no? If no, then what's your point? > > If yes, then why not just say so? > > Logic is certainly not some kind of a psychological theory, but I > think that it makes only metaphorical sense to speak about truths in > themselves as if they were abstract objects. Truth is a property of an > assertoric sentence I don't know this means. Again: Do you claim (1), or not? Yes or no? > and in a *world* of absolute ontological > nothingness there would be no minds and no true sentences either. Logical truths depend only on logical existence, not ontological existence. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net