From: Brian Holtz [brian@holtz.org] Sent: Friday, May 24, 2002 8:34 AM To: alt.atheism.moderated Subject: Re: Science & atheism are cultures. "Paul Holbach" wrote: > > You've again confused ontological and nomological possibility. > > Iīm not confusing anything! There is no such thing as THE only > appropriate reading in metaphysics. There indeed are usages that are appropriate and inappropriate; that is why there are dictionaries and encyclopediae of philosophy. I doubt you could find any such authority that sanctions the use of "ontological possibility" to mean nomological possibility. > any lp statement represents a state of > affairs and thereby a possible ontological fact. Right. > logical=ontological conceivability does > not necessarily entail the nomological possibility of actual > existence. I never said it did. > I admit that (see above) Iīve made a mistake > in suggesting that the content of the possible worlds of logical > imagination is necessarily irreal and non-actual, for it might well be > the case that some possible worlds happen to correspond to other > actual worlds apart from our universe. We all make mistakes. > X is possibly possible means that it might be the case/is possibly > true that X is nomologically possible at some actual world. That > certainly implies that it might as well not be the case/is possibly > false that X is nomologically possible at some world W! No, you've just confused yourself with your "possibly possible" construction. Saying "one plus one possibly equals two" does not "certainly imply" that it might not be the case that 1+1=2. > we cannot decide whether X is nomologically possible at W, > itīs illicit to hold that Xīs logical conceivability entails its > possible nomological actuality. No: for any logically possible circumstance, a possible world can be described in which that circumstance is nomologically possible. > any other actual world there might be will always mean nothing more to > us than any merely possible world of our logical imagination. In that > sense youīd be right in claiming that there is no epistemic difference > - yet an ontological one - between a possible other world and an > actual other world. I don't claim merely that we can't acquire knowledge of whether a given other possible world is actual or not. I in fact claim that there is no candidate difference (other than use of the hollow 6-letter label 'actual') that distinguishes these two cases even in principle. > > > Logical conceivability doesnīt entail the possibility of actual > > > existence. > > > > Yes it does. > > Nope (see above)! For instance, Flying pigs are logically imaginable > but impossibly real. Clarity, please. If by "possibility of actual existence" and "possibly real" you mean nomological possibility, you should say so. If instead you mean ontological possibility, you're simply wrong. > > Yes, but my definition regresses to concepts which are not in > > dispute, whereas your definition is simply a cycle of homonyms > > for the very concept which is in dispute. > > "actual", "real", "factual", "not merely possible" are at most > synonyms not homonyms. As I said, we all make mistakes. :-) > Moreover, given this chain of synonyms I have no trouble at all in > understanding the underlying concept. Your familiarity with these synonyms in their normal domain of usage indeed gives you a level of understanding of the concept, but it manifestly is not a level of understanding that lets you actually define the concept (as opposed to enumerating its synonyms). > > all you've done is say they all mean the same thing, > > while begging the question of what that meaning is. > > [..] "Meaning" just refers to the particular word, phrase or > sentence I use as an interpretant of some given word. If the word used to define the definiendum is itself "defined" using just the definiendum, then in fact no definitions have been given -- all you've done is asserted synonymy. > [..] the fundamental > onto-logical distinction between the real and the imaginary [..] Again: that distinction has a domain of applicability which does not encompass the notion of possible worlds. > > By 'intrinsic' I mean inherent in the concept, > > and independent of the vocabulary of any particular language. > > Please gimme some further explication because I can only vaguely guess > what youīre alluding to. :-) One expression of the concept might contain 'not' etc., but an equally valid expression of the concept might not. > > They can engage in causal relationships, yes. For example, my > > sentence above is part of the causal web that led you to respond > > with your question here. > > Your sentence didnīt cause me to reply to it in the strict sense of > causation. I didn't say it did. > one might at best say that signs have the capacity to motivate the > recipient to react to them in a particular way. That's a fine example of a "causal relationship". > there must be intelligent minds in order for there to be any > truths=true propositions about the world. In a mindless world there > are neither true nor false propositions but only positive states, > events and processes. You're confusing utterances/performances/statements of a proposition with the issue of whether a proposition would be true if it were uttered/performed/stated. The latter is of course independent of the existence of minds. > > it could have been the case that in a particular > > set of circumstances the Sun both did and did not exist? Absurd. > > Yes, that would be absurd indeed, but thatīs not my point. My point is that: 1. I've identified (and you've conceded) an important sense in which it's not the case that (as you claim) the truths of logic are mind-dependent. 2. Your ancillary point that utterances/performances are dependent on uttering/performing minds is quite uninteresting and irrelevant. I frankly don't see how this could be any clearer, and I question the utility of us continuing to repeat the loop we seem to be stuck in. -- brian@holtz.org http://humanknowledge.net